Bank regulators are required to consider a bank's record of providing credit to low-and moderate-income neighborhoods and individuals in approving bank applications for mergers and acquisitions. We provide evidence that banks self-regulate by strategically increasing their lending to these populations prior to acquiring another institution in anticipation of the regulatory and public scrutiny associated with a merger or acquisition. In particular, we show that the higher the percentage of the institution's mortgage originations in a given year that are directed to lowand moderate-income individuals or neighborhoods, the greater the probability that the institution will acquire another bank in the following year. Further investigation bolsters the view that this correlation is due to banks' anticipation of the public and regulatory scrutiny during the merger review process: (1) the effect cannot be explained by regulator behavior or by unobserved bank characteristics; (2) the relationship is observed for acquiring banks, which are the primary focus of scrutiny, but not for the banks that are being acquired; (3) the positive effect increases over the 1991 to 1995 time frame, a period when scrutiny of an institution's community lending record increased; and (4) the effect is largest for big banks, who face particularly intense scrutiny.
Introduction
Between 1975 and 1997 the number of commercial banks and savings associations operating in the U.S. fell by more than 40%, largely due to bank mergers and acquisitions. For example, from 1993 to 1997, 21% of all banking institutions were acquired in a merger or acquisition (Avery et al. 1999) . Banking mergers are scrutinized and restricted along a number of dimensions. For example, both the Federal Reserve and the U.S. Justice Department may refuse to permit mergers that are deemed to be anti -competitive.
1 Bank regulators are also required to consider a bank's record of providing credit to low-and moderateincome neighborhoods and individuals in approving bank mergers and acquisitions, according to the provisions of the 1977 Community Reinvestment Act (CRA).
2 In addition to the formal regulatory review process, community groups also scrutinize bank mergers.
This paper considers how a bank's behavior is affected by the potential scrutiny of its CRA lending record during a merger review. 3 In particular, we test the hypothesis that banks self-regulate by increasing CRA lending prior to acquiring another institution in anticipation of the scrutiny associated with a merger or acquisition. "Self-regulation" here is used in a colloquial sense to reflect actions taken to prevent sanction or punishment prior to regulators taking any action. We find evidence in favor of this hypothesis. We show that the higher the percentage of the institution's mortgage originations in a given year that are directed to low-and moderate-income individuals or neighborhoods, the greater the probability that the institution will acquire another bank in the following year.
This finding is consistent with other studies that show that firms change their behavior to avoid costly regulation. For example, Erfle and McMillan (1990) find that domestic firms restrained prices more during the 1979 oil crisis (a period of regulatory threat) compared to foreign firms. They hypothesize that regulatory outcomes are particularly driven by the behavior of domestic firms. Ellison and Wolfram (2000) find that pharmaceutical firms with more to lose through regulation (firms with longer-lived patents who have greater monopoly rents) lowered prices more in the early 1990s when health care reform that would have included regulation of pharmaceutical prices was being discussed. Maxwell, Lyon and Hackett (2000) find that firms in states with higher membership in conservation groups exhibit higher levels of environmental self-regulation. Stango (2003) shows that credit card issuers lowered interest rates during a period of regulatory threat and that this led to higher stock returns for both the firms that lowered rates as well as those that did not, suggesting that the interest rate cuts resulted in an industry-wide reduction the threat of regulation. In the context of banks and CRA, the regulation is already in place and banks increase lending to low and moderate income households and neighborhoods prior to making an acquisition in an effort to minimize the effect of the regulation.
Further investigation bolsters the view that this correlation is due to banks' anticipation of potential public and regulatory scrutiny during the merger review process. In principle, the relationship between CRA lending and future acquisitions could be driven by regulator rather than by bank behavior. For example, if regulators only approve applications for acquisitions from banks with high levels of CRA lending, we would expect to see a positive correlation between past CRA lending and future acquisitions. We reject this explanation because regulators approve virtually all applications for geographic expansion. From 1990 to 1996, only twenty out of nearly 55,000 applications for expansion were rejected on CRA grounds (see Thomas, 2002) . 4 Indeed, these very low rates of rejection are consistent with the self-regulation hypothesis.
Other potential explanations are explored in the empirical work. For example, the theorized relationship could be driven by a dynamic where banks that have not done a lot of originations decide not to acquire other firms. We show that this can not be the underlying explanation because the results persist even after controlling for the relative level of mortgage activity a bank engages in. Further, we use the panel aspects of the data set to show that the effect cannot be explained by other latent (or omitted) bank characteristics. In addition, the relationship is observed for acquiring banks, which are the focus of public and regulatory scrutiny, but not for merger targets, who face less scrutiny. Moreover, the positive effect of CRA lending on the likelihood that a bank will acquire another bank increases over the 1991 to 1995 time frame. This mirrors the increase in public and regulatory scrutiny of an institution's CRA lending record that occurred over this time period.
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And finally, the effect of lending to low-and moderate-income individuals and neighborhoods is also largest for big banks, who face particularly intense public and regulatory scrutiny. All results are found to be robust to corrections for potential aggregation biases in the data.
These findings imply that enforcement of the Community Reinvestment Act provisions will be particularly effective during periods of consolidation in the banking industry. The effectiveness of the regulation is likely to vary with the likelihood of future acquisitions, or more generally, with the likelihood that banks will have the incentive to self-regulate because they will need regulatory approval for expansion into new geographic areas or into new activities. Several regulatory developments suggest that the CRA may remain an important consideration for some time. For example under the provisions of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999, banks that wish to expand their activities by entering into insurance or security underwriting markets need to seek regulatory approval. Regulators are required to consider a bank's record of CRA lending in deciding whether to allow the bank to expand their activities into these business lines, in much the same way that regulators consider CRA lending in reviewing applications for geographic expansion via mergers and acquisitions.
In the next section, we provide some additional background information on the Community Reinvestment Act and describe the data that we analyze. Section three describes the empirical framework and our main result. In this section, we also present and interpret a series of robustness tests that lead us to conclude that our findings show that banks self-regulate in response to the incentives provided by the merger review process. We discuss our conclusions in section four.
Background Information and Data

Community Reinvestment Act
Congress passed the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) in response to concerns that banks were not meeting the credit needs of local communities. Depository institutions were accused of redlining -that is denying credit to individuals based not on the individuals' characteristics but rather on the characteristics of their neighborhood. The CRA requires banks to meet the credit needs of the communities where they are chartered -including low-and moderate-income communities -in a way that is consistent with safe and sound lending practices. In addition to an annual review, a bank's CRA lending record is also considered when a bank seeks regulatory approval to open new branches or to acquire or merge with another banking institution.
Regulatory agencies perform an evaluation "to assess the institution's record of meeting the credit needs of the entire community, including low-and moderate-income neighborhoods, consistent with the safe and sound operation of each institution" (Regulation BB). The specifics of these evaluations have evolved since the CRA's passage in 1977. The regulations saw major revisions in 1991 and 1995. As the empirical work focuses on lending from 1991-1995, the discussion that follows describes how the regulation was enforced after the 1991 revisions, drawing heavily on Evanoff and Segal (1996) . Up until 1995, regulators considered five performance categories in evaluating an institution's CRA performance (see Evanoff and Segal for a detailed description): 1) Ascertainment of community credit needs 2) Marketing and types of credit offered and extended 3) Geographic distribution and record of opening and closing offices 4) Discrimination and other illegal credit practices 5) Community development Banks were given one of four ratings based on this evaluation: outstanding, satisfactory, needs to improve or substantial non-compliance.
Banks with unsatisfactory CRA ratings were not explicitly sanctioned, although instances of illegal credit practices could be referred to the Justice Department for further legal action. Instead, regulators considered an institution's CRA record, together with other factors, when deciding whether to approve an application for a geographic expansion of facilities through a merger or acquisition, the introduction of new branches, and office change, etc. Evanoff and Segal argue that even if an application were ultimately approved, banks suffered from having a poor CRA rating or being accused of having poor CRA performance, particularly during a period of consolidation:
For example, the application process can be significantly lengthened and complicated if community groups protest the application. In a period in which banks were aggressively expanding geographically, the potential for lost deals, delays in expansion, and negative public relations could be quite burdensome. (Evanoff and Segal, 1996) Our analysis of the data is directed at evaluating whether banks responded to the explicit and implicit incentives to self-regulate that are incorporated into the CRA legislation by increasing CRA lending prior to making an acquisition.
Regulatory and public scrutiny of CRA lending, particularly as it pertains to applications for consolidation, increased during the early 1990's. First, beginning in June 1990, each bank's CRA ratings were made public. 6 Second, amendments to the Act in 1991 strengthened the provisions for public disclosure of CRA ratings. Third, the CRA was also bolstered by President Clinton's election in 1992, given his very public support of community reinvestment. 7 In May of 1993 6 Although CRA ratings are publicly available, we do not use these data in our analysis because there is little variation in the ratings across banks or over time for a given bank. Almost 80% of banks receive "satisfactory" ratings. The fraction of banks that receive ratings below satisfactory dropped from 10% to 2% during the period we study, and the fraction of banks receiving outstanding ratings started out at 10% at the beginning of the period and reached 27% in 1996 (Thomas, 2002) . 7 See Thomas (2002) . In July of 1993, President Clinton called for a reform of CRA to make the law more effective and efficient. That effort culminated in the passage of the 1995 amendments to CRA, which call for regulators to analyze actions rather than intentions in reviewing CRA records.
regulators sent a letter to all banks and thrifts reiterating their commitment to the effective enforcement of fair lending laws. 8 Finally, the passage of the RiegleNeal Interstate Branching and Efficiency Act in 1994 led to an increase in the pace of consolidation in the banking industry. This in turn augmented the importance of CRA, since a bank's CRA record was considered during the review of applications for consolidation and expansion. 
Data and Summary Statistics
In order to evaluate whether banks self-regulate by increasing CRA lending prior to the regulatory process associated with a merger or acquisition, we need a data set that includes time-series information on CRA lending, mergers and acquisitions and bank characteristics. We combine information from three sources to create this data for the period 1990 to 1995.
10 Information on the amount of CRA lending each bank does each year comes from data filed under the 1989 amendments to the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA). We use the Federal Reserve Board's National Information Center (NIC) database to track bank mergers and acquisitions. Additional information on bank characteristics comes from the Reports on the Condition and Income (Call Reports) that banks file with regulators each year.
We use the HMDA data to quantify the amount of CRA lending that an institution originated during a year. Each year, nearly all commercial banks, savings and loan associations, credit unions and other mortgage lending institutions (primarily mortgage banks) with assets of more than $10 million and an office in a metropolitan statistical area (MSA) are required to report on each mortgage loan application related to a one-to four-unit residence acted upon during the calendar year. Following the procedures for reviewing an institution's CRA performance, we define CRA lending as the percentage of the institution's total home mortgage originations in a year that are:
(i) to low-and moderate-income neighborhoods, or (ii) to low-and moderate-income individuals located in any neighborhood. Following the regulation, we consider a loan to be a CRA loan if it satisfies either condition. For this analysis, low-and moderate-income neighborhoods are defined as census tracts with a median family income that is less than 80% of the median family income for the metropolitan statistical area (MSA). Low-and
The new CRA review procedures were implemented in 1996 and 1997, so they do not directly affect banks during the 1991 -1995 period that we examine. 8 Minneapolis Fed Gazette, July 1993. This issue also contains further details of increasing regulatory scrutiny of community lending activities over this period. 9 See Joint Center for Housing Studies (2002) . 10 We analyze whether a bank made an acquisition during the period 1991 -1995, but include information about CRA lending and bank characteristics in the year prior to the acquisition, so we make use of HMDA and Call Report data from 1990 to 1994. moderate-income individuals are defined as individuals whose income is less than 80% of the median family income for the MSA.
Our measure of CRA lending is based solely on home-mortgage lending because public data are only available for mortgages over the period we study. While regulators focused on a broader range of loan products during the CRA review process, banks were not required to report on other activities, such as small business and farm loans and community development lending, during this period.
11 Our reliance on the HMDA data means that we exclude banks whose assets are less than $10 million and banks that do not have offices in an MSA. This is unlikely to lead to serious biases, since approximately 80% of all home purchase loans are covered by the HMDA data for the period we study (Avery et al.,1999) .
We use the Federal Reserve Board's National Information Center (NIC) database to identify banks that were acquired and banks that acquired other banks during each calendar year. In most cases the identification of acquirers and targets was straightforward. However, in a few instances the consolidation resulted in a new organization. In such cases, the institution with the largest preconsolidation assets was defined to be the acquirer. We identify acquirers and targets at the bank level, rather than at the bank holding company level. For example, if a bank holding company acquired another bank, all of the original affiliates of the bank holding company are defined to be acquirers in that transaction.
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In addition to the information on CRA lending and mergers, we also use data from the Call Reports that banks file each year. The Call Report data are used to construct important variables -total assets, capital ratios, leverage ratios -for each bank. In the analysis, we control for these key bank characteristics so that we can appropriately interpret the role of CRA lending in predicting bank behavior.
The data we analyze consist of five years of information for about 4,800 banks, for a total of 24,000 bank-years. Table 1 documents the number of banks that acquired another bank and the number of banks that were acquired by another bank in each year of the data that we analyze. The percentage of banks that acquired another bank ranges from 8 percent in 1991 to a high of 11 percent in 11 The 1995 amendments to CRA include new provisions requiring banks to report small business and small farm lending. 12 The analysis is conducted at the bank level because the CRA scrutinizes activity at this level rather than at the bank holding company level. That said, our results are robust to aggregating the data by bank holding company -i.e. treating all of the members of a bank holding company as a single observation.
1994. The percentage of banks that were the target of a merger is much smaller, ranging from 3 percent in 1991 to 5 percent in 1994.
13 Table 1 Number of Bank Acquirers and Targets by Year This table reports the total number of banks in the study sample, as well as the number and fraction of the banks that were acquirers or targets in a given year. A bank is considered an acquirer (target) if the bank or its holding company made an acquisition (was acquired) in a given year. Thus, the acquisition of a single bank by a bank holding company lead to more acquirers than targets, since each bank in the bank holding company will be considered to have made an acquisition in this case. Study sample banks are those for which mortgage data (from the HMDA), balance sheet information (Call Report), and merger information (NIC) could be matched. Table 2 summarizes the data for the whole sample of bank-years and separately for acquiring banks and banks that were acquired. As one would expect, acquiring banks are much larger -total assets of the average acquiring bank are 2.3 times larger than that of the average target bank. Acquiring banks are also more likely to be part of a bank holding company, 97 percent versus 78 percent for targets of mergers. CRA loans make up a similar share (about onethird) of acquirer and target loan originations. The vast majority of CRA loans are made to low-and moderate-income areas, rather than to individuals. Acquirers have a slightly higher ratio of loans to total assets compared to target 13 This result is an artifact of our treatment of each bank in a holding company as a single observation. The acquisition of a single bank by a bank holding company will lead to more acquirers than targets, since each bank in the bank holding company will be considered to have made an acquisition in this case. Recall that the results are robust to treating all of the members of a bank holding company as a single institution. banks: 60 percent versus 56 percent. The share of total lending represented by mortgage loans for target banks is 57 percent, about 10 percent higher than the share for acquiring banks.
Empirical Framework and Results
This section presents tests of our central hypothesis: that banks self-regulate by increasing CRA lending in advance of acquiring another institution in anticipation of the regulatory and public scrutiny associated with a merger or acquisition. We also present a number of other estimates to examine the robustness of the results and to assess whether they are in fact driven by bank reaction to regulatory incentives.
Main Finding
Our main finding is presented in the columns headed "Limited Bank Controls" in Table 3 . These columns report maximum likelihood logit estimates of the likelihood that a bank acquires another bank in a given year as a function of CRA lending in the previous 12 months, controls for bank characteristics, also measured in the year prior to the data on acquisitions, and year controls. Specifically, the estimation chooses parameters ( , , and ) to maximize:
The dependent variable, A it , is equal to one if bank i made an acquisition in year t and is equal to zero otherwise. The vector X it-1 includes bank size (measured as the log of total assets), an indicator variable that is equal to one if the bank is a member of a bank holding company, the bank's capital to asset ratio, and the bank's mortgage lending to asset ratio. This final variable is included as a control to account for the alternative theory that banks that did not engage in significant mortgage lending chose not to acquire other banks. The vector Y t contains indicators for each year from 1991 to 1994. The most recent year that our data covers, 1995, is the omitted category. We estimate this equation for the 24,406 bank-years in the study sample.
We find that large banks are significantly more likely to acquire other banks. Increasing assets from $585 million (the average for all banks) to $1570 million (the average for acquiring banks) would increase the probability of an acquisition in the next calendar year by about 2 percentage points, a 20 percent increase in the Table 3 . Logit Estimates of the Probability of Making an Acquisition The table presents logit estimates of the probability of making an acquisition in the current calendar year as a function of the CRA eligible share of originations in the previous year, bank size (log of total assets) in the previous year, the ratio of capital to assets in the previous year, the ratio of mortgage lending to assets in the previous year and a variable that is equal to one if the bank is a member of a Bank Holding Company (BHC). In addition, the estimates include controls for years. The dependent variable is equal to one if the bank or its holding company made an acquisition in the calendar year. The sample includes bank-year observations from 1991 to 1995. *** Indicates significance at the 1% level. ** Indicates significance at the 5% level, and * indicates significance at the 10% level.
Limited The probability of an acquisition is also significantly influenced by the percentage of the bank's mortgage originations that went to low-or moderateincome individuals and areas in the preceding calendar year. The results indicate that moving a bank from the 25 th percentile to the 75 th percentile of the CRA lending distribution would lead to a 0.76 percentage point increase in the average probability of an acquisition in the following year.
14 This is an increase of 7.8 percent in the average probability of an acquisition. To achieve an equivalent increase in the probability of an acquisition, total assets of the average bank would have to increase by 43 percent or $252 million. 
Robustness and Interpretation
The main finding is consistent with the notion that banks increase CRA lending prior to making an acquisition and that the effect is economically significant. However, it is also consistent with other hypotheses, such as the idea that banks with consistently higher CRA performance are consistently more likely to acquire other banks. This section includes a series of tests to further explores whether the correlation between CRA lending and future acquisitions can be attributed to a desire on the part of the bank to self-regulate to ensure that the public and regulatory review of its acquisition plans go smoothly.
Other bank characteristics
An alternative explanation for the finding that CRA lending predicts future acquisitions is that banks with high CRA lending happen to be more likely to make acquisitions for some reason that has nothing to do with the regulatory and public scrutiny associated with an acquisition. For example, maybe banks in large urban areas have higher CRA lending and are also more likely to make acquisitions. Or perhaps retail banks have higher CRA lending and are also more 14 The bank at the 25 th percentile of the CRA lending distribution makes 16.7% of its home mortgage loans to low-and moderate-income individuals or areas. At the 75 th percentile, 48.5% of home mortgage loans go to low-and moderate-income individuals or areas. 15 Some might be concerned that including target banks in the estimation might introduce selection bias, since such banks were involved in the transaction of interest. We therefore repeated the analysis omitting those observations involving banks that were target institutions. The results using this alternative specification were identical to those reported in the text that included the entire study sample. likely to acquire other banks. Another possibility is that more efficient banks do more CRA lending and are also more likely to make acquisitions.
We address these possibilities by taking advantage of the panel nature of the data set and add bank fixed effects to the original estimation specification. The fixed effects control for time-invariant bank specific characteristics. These estimates provide an answer to the question: If a bank increases CRA lending, does the likelihood that it makes an acquisition go up? In contrast, the baseline estimate shows that banks with higher levels of CRA lending have a greater likelihood of making an acquisition, compared to other banks.
Because fixed effects estimates include a control variable for every single bank, banks that made no acquisitions between 1991 and 1995 and banks that made an acquisition in every year of the sample are dropped from the estimation. The fixed effect fully explains the acquisition patterns for these banks. We are therefore left with a sample of 4,510 bank-years (902 banks). Summary statistics for the fixed-effects sample are in the far-right column of Table 2 .
The fixed-effects results, estimated using a conditional logit, are found in the columns of Table 3 headed "Fixed Effect Bank Controls." Most results are quite similar to those found in section 3.1, with the lone exceptions being that (1) the capital-asset ratio is now a significant predictor of whether a bank will be an acquiring institution and (2) the probability of acquisition in 1994 is no longer different from that in 1995. 16 Regarding the main hypothesis, the results show that past CRA lending is a significant and important predictor of future acquisitions even when we control for bank fixed effects. Figure 1 summarizes the effect of CRA lending on the probability of future acquisitions for the fixed effect estimate. This finding rules out the possibility that the association between CRA lending and future acquisitions is driven by some other time-invariant bank characteristic that was not captured in the estimates that did not include bank fixed effects. The likelihood of making an acquisition would increase by 3.3 percentage points if a bank were to go from the 25 th percentile to the 75 th percentile of CRA lending. 17 This is equivalent to an 8 percent increase in the overall likelihood of making acquisition for these banks.
Targets
Regulatory and public scrutiny is typically more heavily focused on acquiring banks than on the banks that they acquire. If the relationship between CRA Figure 1 : Impact of CRA Lending on the Probability of Acquisition This table shows how the median probability of that a lender acquires another bank varies with the percentage of the lender's mortgage originations comprised of CRA loans, based on the fixed effect estimates reported in Table 3 . The predicted probability of acquisition was estimated for each bank in the sample, and each point on the figure represents the median probability of acquisition among all banks with a given CRA mortgage origination proportion.
Table 4 Logit Estimates of the Probability of Being the Target of an Acquisition
The table presents logit estimates of the probability of being the target of an acquisition in the current calendar year as a function of the CRA eligible share of originations in the previous year, bank size (log of total assets) in the previous year, the ratio of capital to assets in the previous year, the ratio of mortgage lending to assets in the previous year and a variable that is equal to one if the bank is a member of a Bank Holding Company (BHC). In addition, the estimates include controls for years. The dependent variable is equal to one if the bank or its holding company was acquired during the calendar year. The sample is made up of bank-year observations from 1991 to 1995. *** Indicates significance at the 1% level. ** Indicates significance at the 5% level, and * indicates significance at the 10% level. lending and future acquisitions is driven by a desire to prepare for the regulatory and public scrutiny associated with a merger, then we would expect to see no relationship between CRA lending and the probability of being acquired by another bank. Because merger targets typically face much less scrutiny, they will have lower incentives to increase CRA lending prior to being acquired. This hypothesis is explored in Table 4 . This table presents logit estimates of the probability of being the target of a merger for the 24,406 bank-years in the study sample.
18 Banks with higher capital to asset ratios are less likely to be acquired and members of a bank holding company are more likely to be acquired. Banks are less likely to be acquired in 1991 and 1992 and more likely to be acquired in 1994 relative to 1995. Consistent with expectations, CRA lending has no statistical or substantive impact on the likelihood of being the target of a merger. This finding bolsters the argument that the anticipation of public and regulatory scrutiny drives the link between CRA lending and future acquisitions. Further, the results suggest that regulators do not give acquirers credit for the target's CRA record.
Year
In section 2.1, we provide evidence that public and regulatory scrutiny of a bank's CRA lending record became more intense over the 1991 to 1995 time period that we study. If the connection between CRA lending and future acquisitions is due to bank self-regulation in anticipation of the public and regulatory scrutiny associated with a merger, then the effect of CRA lending on the probability of future acquisitions should increase through time. We test this hypothesis in Table  5 . Table 5 presents logit estimates of the probability of acquiring another bank as a function of the control variables discussed above. In addition, the effect of CRA lending is allowed to vary by year. Separate coefficients are estimated to capture the effect of CRA lending in 1990 on acquisitions in 1991, of CRA lending in 1991 on acquisitions in 1992 and so on. CRA lending in 1990 and 1991 does not have a significant impact on the probability of an acquisition in the following years. However, the effect of CRA lending is increasing and significant from 1992 to 1994. Figure 2 summarizes the effect of a 25 percent increase in CRA lending on the probability of future acquisitions for each year.
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The size of the CRA effect is not statistically different across the 1992 to 1994 time period. However, the effect of CRA lending in 1992, 1993 and 1994 is 18 To consider the possibility of selection bias, a set of regressions were run in which bank-years where a bank made an acquisition were omitted. These results were qualitatively identical to those using the full sample. 19 The 25 th percentile of the CRA lending distribution rose from 15% in 1992 to 20% in 1994. The 75 th percentile increased from 46% to 50% over the same time period.
significantly larger than the effect of CRA lending in 1990 and 1991 (parametric tests not shown). It is important to note that this estimate also includes individual year controls, which capture the effect of other trends that might impact the likelihood of an acquisition over the period.
20
The pattern of temporal change in behavior is what one might expect given political developments at the time. Unlike the Bush administration during 1990 and 1991, the Clinton administration established community reinvestment as a high profile and important priority. Thus, the elevated effect of CRA lending in 1993 and 1994 is not surprising given that it corresponds directly with increased attention given to CRA at the federal level during this time. Regarding 1992, given that polls had shown Clinton leading the presidential race for much of that year, it is plausible that lenders began giving increased attention to CRA-related matters during this transitional year.
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The evidence that the association between CRA lending and future acquisitions is stronger when regulatory and public attention is more intense provides additional evidence that it is this scrutiny provides incentives for banks to self-regulate by increasing CRA lending prior to making acquisitions.
Size
Public and regulatory scrutiny is particularly intense for big banks that make acquisitions. One reason for this is that larger institutions typically have higher lending volumes, and may in turn have a potentially greater impact on a community. As a result, the actions of such institutions are of particular interest to both community organizations and regulatory agencies.
To the extent that the relationship between CRA lending and acquisitions is driven by a desire to self-regulate in advance of this scrutiny, we would expect CRA lending to have a larger impact on the probability of an acquisition for big banks compared to smaller banks. We explore this possibility in Table 6 . This table reports the results of logit estimates of the probability of an acquisition as a function of the same independent variables as the previous estimates, with one exception. In this estimate the impact of CRA lending is allowed to vary with the size of the bank. Separate coefficients for CRA lending are estimated for each asset quartile. The table presents logit estimates of the probability of making an acquisition in the current calendar year as a function of the CRA eligible share of originations in the previous year, bank size (log of total assets) in the previous year, the ratio of capital to assets in the previous year, the ratio of mortgage lending to assets in the previous year and a variable that is equal to one if the bank is a member of a Bank Holding Company (BHC). The impact of CRA lending is allowed to vary by year. In addition, the estimates include controls for years. The dependent variable is equal to one if the bank or its holding company made an acquisition in the current calendar year. The sample is made up of bank-year observations from 1991 to 1995. *** Indicates significance at the 1% level. ** Indicates significance at the 5% level, and * indicates significance at the 10% level. This table shows how a 25 percent increase in a bank's CRA lending would affect a bank's probability of acquiring another bank in a subsequent year, based on the estimates reported in Table 4 . The predicted change in the probability of acquisition was estimated for each bank in the sample for each year and the average changes are reported.
The relationship between CRA lending and the probability of future acquisitions is driven by banks whose assets are in the upper half of the size distribution. For banks in the lowest quartile of assets, CRA lending actually has a significantly negative effect on the probability of future acquisitions. CRA lending has no significant effect on acquisitions for banks in the second asset quartile. CRA lending has a significant and positive effect for banks in the third and fourth asset quartiles. For banks in the third asset quartile, going from the 25 th to the 75 th percentile of the CRA lending distribution will lead to a 0.89 percentage point increase in the probability of an acquisition. The effect for banks in the highest asset quartile is significantly larger. For these banks, a similar increase in CRA lending is associated with an increase in the probability of an acquisition of 2.29 percentage points. 22 The effect of a 25 percent increase in CRA lending on the probability of an acquisition for banks in each asset quartile is summarized in Figure 3 .
The evidence presented in Table 6 and summarized in Figure 3 reinforces the view that banks self-regulate and prepare for the public and regulatory attention associated with an acquisition by increasing CRA lending in anticipation of making an acquisition.
Estimation precision
A final issue explored here is the precision of the estimates. The analysis is done at the bank level, but the method for identifying acquiring banks relies on bank holding company relationships. Thus, if a bank holding company with five banks acquires a bank, then our data will show each of the holding company's five banks as a separate acquiring institution. The acquiring decisions for these five observations are clearly correlated, and so the residuals from the regression estimates are likely not independent. In such an instance, standard errors may be too small and the estimates may be reported as more precise than appropriate.
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To address this issue, we re-estimated all regressions for the analysis using a clustering technique that explicitly recognizes correlations across observations within the sample. This exercise, the results of which are not shown, yielded results fully consistent with those reported and discussed above. 22 While the 25 th percentile of the CRA lending distribution is fairly similar across asset quartile, ranging from 15.4% to 17.7%, the 75 th percentile decreases with bank size. For the first asset quartile it is 60% and for the highest asset quartile it is 37.5%. So for the third asset quartile, a 27.4 percentage point increase in CRA lending is associated with a 0.89 percentage point increase in the likelihood of making an acquisition in the following year. For banks in the highest asset quartile, a 19.8 percentage point increase in CRA lending produces a 2.29 percentage point increase in the probability of an acquisition in the following year. 23 We thank an anonymous referee for highlighting this point. Table 6 Logit Estimates of the Probability of Making an Acquisition, The Impact of CRA by Bank Size The table presents logit estimates of the probability of making an acquisition in the current calendar year as a function of the CRA eligible share of originations in the previous year, bank size (log of total assets) in the previous year, the ratio of capital to assets in the previous year, the ratio of mortgage lending to assets in the previous year and a variable that is equal to one if the bank is a member of a Bank Holding Company (BHC). The impact of CRA lending is allowed to vary with bank size, where bank size is captured by quartiles of total assets. In addition, the estimates include controls for years. The dependent variable is equal to one if the bank or its holding company made an acquisition in the current calendar year. The sample includes of bank-year observations from 1991 to 1995. *** Indicates significance at the 1% level. ** Indicates significance at the 5% level, and * indicates significance at the 10% level. This table shows how a 25 percent increase in a bank's CRA lending would affect a bank's probability of acquiring another bank in a subsequent year, based on the estimates reported in Table 6 . The predicted change in the probability of acquisition was estimated for each bank in the sample for each year and the average changes for banks grouped by asset size are reported.
Conclusions and Directions for Future Research
This paper presents evidence demonstrating that banks self-regulate by increasing CRA lending prior to making an acquisition in anticipation of the regulatory and public scrutiny associated with making an acquisition. The results cannot be explained by other bank characteristics, and they are strongest for banks that face the most public and regulatory scrutiny. In addition to being statistically significant, the results are also potentially economically important. At a minimum, moving from the 25 th to the 75 th percentile of the distribution of CRA lending is associated with a 0.8 percentage point increase in the likelihood of making an acquisition in the following year. The total assets of the average bank would have to increase by 43 percent, or $252 million, to achieve an equivalent increase in the probability of an acquisition. For the marginal bank, the fixed effect estimates are the most relevant, because this sample excludes banks that make acquisitions in every year and banks that make no acquisitions over the sample period. The fixed effects estimates indicate that the same change in CRA lending would lead to a 3.3 percentage point increase in the likelihood of an acquisition. It is important to keep in mind, though, that few banks show such large changes in CRA lending; for most, the effects will be relatively small.
The findings suggest that enforcement of the Community Reinvestment Act provisions is particularly effective during periods of consolidation in the banking industry. The effectiveness of the regulation is likely to vary with the likelihood of future acquisitions or, more generally, with the likelihood that banks will have incentives to self-regulate because they will need regulatory approval for expansion into new geographic areas or into new activities. Several regulatory developments suggest that the CRA might remain an important consideration for some time. For example under the provisions of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, banks that wish to expand their activities into insurance and/or security underwriting will need to seek regulatory approval. Regulators are required to consider a bank's record of community lending in deciding whether to allow the bank to expand their activities into these product areas, in much the same way that regulators currently consider CRA lending in reviewing applications for geographic expansion via mergers and acquisitions.
Finally, given our finding that banks respond to the CRA in a significant way, an important consideration is the cost associated with these activities. While our data do not permit an estimate of costs, a number of recent studies have examined the performance and profitability of CRA-related lending. 24 These studies suggest that CRA lending is profitable on the whole, although its higher default and delinquency rates make it less profitable than other categories of lending 24 See, for example, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (2000), Avery, Bostic, and Canner (forthcoming), Passmore (1997), and Phillips-Patrick, Malmquist, and Rossi (1997). banks engage in. Thus, there is a lending-related opportunity cost associated with responding to CRA incentives.
